An empirical investigation into the propensity of reckless decision making within the high pressure environment of Deal or No Deal. by Whitle, Richard et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
An empirical investigation into the
propensity of reckless decision making
within the high pressure environment of
Deal or No Deal.
Richard Whitle and Jonathan Rae and Chris Pyke
Manchester Metropolitan University, Keele University, Manchester
Metropolitan University, Manchester Metropolitan University
2015
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/66832/
MPRA Paper No. 66832, posted 23. September 2015 13:39 UTC
 1 
AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION INTO THE 
PROPENSITY OF RECKLESS DECISION-MAKING 
WITHIN THE HIGH-PRESSURE ENVIRONMENT 
OF DEAL OR NO DEAL 
 
Richard Whittle1 
Senior Lecturer (Economics), Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics, 
Manchester Metropolitan University 
 
Jonathan Rae 
Doctoral Researcher, Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics, 
Manchester Metropolitan University 
 
Chris Pyke 
Professor (Finance), Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics, 
Manchester Metropolitan University 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses human attitudes towards risk and the development of 
expected utility models, laying the foundations for the creation of prospect 
theory in 1979. It proceeds to analyse the decisions of contestants on the 
popular TV game show Deal or No Deal to attempt to observe any evidence 
of differing levels of risk aversion under losses and gains as predicted by 
prospect theory. The results reveal some evidence of decreased risk aversion 
in the domains of losses and gains, with contestants displaying behaviour 
consistent with the break-even and house-money effects. We conclude there 
may be enough evidence of variable reference points to warrant further 
investigation, and propose suggestions for further research. 
Key words: Decision making under uncertainty, behavioural economics, 
behavioural finance, biases & heuristics, Prospect Theory. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Human attitudes towards risk have always played their part in the decision-making 
process. The St. Petersburg paradox first described by Swiss mathematician Nicolas 
Bernoulli in 1713 arises when dealing with infinite expected monetary values, 
ultimately suggesting that expected-wealth maximising individuals would pay an 
infinite amount of money to take a gamble with a very low probability of receiving 
an infinite amount in return. The solution to this paradox led to the first formulation 
of expected utility theory (EUT) in 1738 by Nicolas’ Cousin, Daniel Bernoulli 
(Bernoulli, 1954). The essence of Bernoulli’s solution introduced the concepts of a 
utility function and of diminishing marginal utility, ensuring that even gambles with 
an infinite expected value have a finite expected utility. 
The theory was used as the foundations for further research into attitudes towards 
gambles, leading to the development of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
theorem in 1947 (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). This formulation 
incorporated the inherent risk aversion typically exhibited by individuals and was 
adopted by economists. 
Since then, the shortcomings of EUT have repeatedly been highlighted by various 
studies, with the use of linear probability weighting functions (Allais, 1953) and the 
inability of the theory to provide a plausible account of risk aversion over moderate 
stakes (Arrow, 1971) prompting criticism and development. The effects that framing 
can have on a decision-maker prove that individuals consider more than simply the 
objective features of a gamble (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Whilst EUT can 
explain some risk aversion over very large stakes, its scope is limited to these very 
specific scenarios. 
The anomaly of risk aversion within the EUT framework has been studied in depth 
(Rabin & Thaler, 2001). It has been proposed that prospect theory (PT) better 
describes individuals’ attitudes towards risk due to the incorporation of loss aversion 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Tests run within the paper show that individuals will 
often reject moderate stakes gambles when faced with an equal chance of winning £x 
or losing £x, implying the utility function of gains and losses is not symmetrical. 
Furthermore, the origin represents the reference point for an individual, the relative 
location of which varies over time and circumstance. PT incorporates these important 
differences into its model. In addition, this increased sensitivity to losses relative to 
gains can see an increase or decrease in risk-seeking behaviour when evaluating 
gambles, depending on the location of the individual’s reference point. 
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This paper will study contestant decisions in Deal or No Deal, a popular TV game 
show. From here, it will attempt to identify any evidence of contestants exhibiting an 
increase in risk-seeking behaviour when operating in the domain of losses (DoL), 
and/or a decrease in risk-seeking behaviour when operating in the domain of gains 
(DoG). The definitions of each domain will be clearly defined in section IV of the 
paper. The paper proceeds as follows. Section II introduces the game show and will 
explore the findings of any similar studies. Section III expands on the nature and 
implications of prospect theory, as well as detailing the various underlying 
psychological biases applicable to this study. Section IV details the methodology and 
data analysed. In Section V contestants’ utilities about different prize amounts are 
modelled, and various coefficients are developed in an attempt to quantify the risk of 
accepting a gamble. Section VI presents the results and analysis with reference to 
noticeable differences in behaviour between domains. Section VII concludes the 
paper. 
 
II. DEAL OR NO DEAL AND SIMILAR STUDIES 
Conceived in the Netherlands, Deal or No Deal’s popularity has seen it spread to 
various countries around the world, although the format has remained largely the 
same. This paper will use the UK version of the game. Whilst various studies have 
used other game shows to measure risk attitudes (Beetsma & Schotman, 2001; 
Gertner, 1993; Hartley et al., 2013), Deal or No Deal is unique in terms of its structure 
and rules, and provides the perfect environment in which to examine decision-making 
under uncertainty. The lack of any quiz-type elements significantly reduces the effect 
intelligence has on the prosperity of a contestant’s game, in turn increasing the 
significance of good fortune. It can be postulated that dealing with pressure and 
managing to overcome greed and psychological biases are the most important skills 
a contestant can have, to ensure a consistent and considered decision-making process 
is followed when required. 
The standard2 game consists of 22 numbered boxes, each with a value hidden inside, 
from 1p to £250,000. A contestant selects a box, which becomes their box for the rest 
of the game. They then proceed to open the remaining boxes one by one, thus 
eliminating values from the game. After five boxes have been opened, an individual 
known as “the banker” contacts the contestant and makes an offer for the contestant’s 
box. The contestant can choose to accept (deal) or reject (no deal) this offer. The 
                                                          
2 Whilst Deal or No Deal in the UK has a standard format outlined in this section, the show does 
occasionally see deviations from this format, often themed to coincide with various holiday 
seasons. For sake of consistency and accuracy, this paper will only use data from episodes that 
used the standard format. 
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banker will then make another offer after every three boxes opened thereafter. If the 
contestant removes high value boxes, the banker’s offer decreases, reflecting a drop 
in the expected value of the contestant’s box, and vice versa. As such a contestant 
wishes to open only low value boxes up until the point they choose the deal, and 
subsequently only open high value boxes. This ideal scenario sees the contestant 
choose to deal at the highest possible offer, before eventually with luck having an 
amount in their box lower than or equal to the value at which they dealt. If a player 
elects to stay in the game until the very end, they are presented with a final choice 
which is to “Swap” or “No Swap”. This refers to swapping their box with the one 
remaining box left in play, claiming the contents of this box as a prize instead. 
Various phenomena have been observed by a previous study conducted into decision-
making within Deal or No Deal (Post et al., 2008). In this study, a contestant on the 
Dutch3 edition of the show named Frank had a particularly unlucky run of boxes 
before removing the largest remaining value of €500,000. This saw the expected 
value of his box to drop from €102,006 to €2508. Frank went on to reject all 
subsequent offers, the last of which was 120% of the expected value. This increase 
in risk-seeking behaviour is consistent with the break even effect, with Frank 
attempting to recoup some of his losses. An elegant example of an increasing Risk 
appetite in loss. 
The same paper explored the game of Susanne, a contestant on the German edition 
of the game. Susanne, contrary to Frank, had a particularly fortunate run of boxes and 
was left with €100,000 and €150,000 in play. She rejected an offer of €125,000, 
instead choosing to gamble on and ultimately won the larger amount of €150,000. 
This was despite the banker offer being 100% of the expected value, 2% higher than 
the average amount offered by the banker at the same stage of the game to other 
contestants categorised as “winners”. This was behaviour representative of the house-
money effect, or an increase in risk-seeking behaviour due to the sensation of playing 
with someone else’s money. This is due to the fact that Susanne would still feel like 
a winner even if she won the minimum amount possible (€100,000). 
The break-even effect exhibited by Frank is consistent with the predictions of 
Kahneman and Tversky, as if Frank’s reference point had been the expected value of 
his box or the largest offer so far, removing the €500,000 would certainly place Frank 
in the domain of losses and would incite risk-seeking behaviour. Interestingly 
however, Susanne’s display of risk-seeking behaviour is not in line with the 
predictions of prospect theory, which suggests increased risk aversion in the domain 
of gains. It is argued by the paper that both the break-even and house-money effects 
are examples of individuals failing to completely adapt to prior losses and gains. It 
                                                          
3 The Dutch version of the show is different in that it is played over 9 rounds and there is 
considerably more money at stake. 
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may also be the case that Susanne is an extremely risk-seeking person, and when 
operating in the domain of gains at the end did display an increase in risk aversion, 
relative to her behaviour in earlier rounds.  
It has been suggested that certain industries attract individuals with a higher risk 
tolerance (Nguyen & Leung, 2009). As such, contestants on Deal or No Deal, whilst 
heterogeneous about their specific risk preferences, can perhaps be assumed to be 
less risk-averse than their non-contestant counterparts. This may have important 
implications within the construct of this study, and as a result it will not necessarily 
be possible to generalise any findings of this study to individuals in the wider world. 
III. PROSPECT THEORY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BIASES 
As touched on in section I, the introduction of prospect theory in 1979 introduced 
new concepts that are intuitively easy to understand yet could not be explained by 
EUT. The first of these was the idea that individuals evaluate their situation or choices 
around some reference point and do not associate utility with absolute values of 
wealth, but rather with gains and losses around this reference point. This reference 
point can be the status quo, but occasionally might be expected gains or losses. The 
idea of a variable reference point is described by the following example. 
Two individuals, Alex and Beth, possess equivalent initial wealth. Alex takes a 
gamble with a 99% chance of winning £100,000 and a 1% chance of winning nothing. 
Beth takes a gamble with a 1% chance of winning £100,000 and a 99% chance of 
winning nothing. Both gambles are risk free, in that nothing can be lost. According 
to EUT, therefore, no utility can be lost, and everyone would be expected to take the 
gamble. If neither gamble wins however, it’s fair to assume that Alex will be more 
disappointed than Beth. This is indicative of Alex effectively setting up a new 
reference point for himself due to the overwhelming odds of winning the gamble 
(Kahneman, 2011). 
As such, a Deal or No Deal contestant’s reference point may take on multiple values, 
not only between subjects but over the course of an individual’s game. These values 
could match initial hopes/expectations, the highest offer received so far or the 
estimated expected value of the contestant’s box. It could also be the case that as with 
the preceding example contestants doing particularly well or poorly tentatively set up 
new reference points for themselves according to how they think they’re likely to do. 
The position of the reference point must be known to determine whether contestants 
are operating in the domains of losses and gains, and thus will be clearly defined in 
section IV. 
Whilst prospect theory’s contribution of evaluating gambles with regards to losses 
and gains about a reference point was undoubtedly an important one to the study of 
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decision-making under uncertainty, the theory was not without its limitations. The 
original paper’s choice problems posed to test subjects were hypothetical situations 
using moderate amounts in which no money was really ever going to be won or lost. 
Evidence since has shown that whilst risk aversion increases sharply as real potential 
gains or losses increase (Bosch-Domènech & Silvestre, 1999), the same cannot be 
said for hypothetical scenarios (Holt & Laury, 2002). Furthermore, psychological 
stress has been shown to impede the decision-making process (Keinan, 1987). With 
TV cameras, life-changing amounts of money, time constraints and the knowledge 
that a contestant probably has just one opportunity to play the game4, there is strong 
evidence to support that Deal or No Deal is an extremely stressful environment. 
With rational decision-making expected to be affected then, the importance and 
prominence of various psychological biases may enter into play. Biases can be 
categorised as either cognitive or emotional (Pompian, 2012). Cognitive biases are 
“basic statistical, information processing or memory errors that can deviate from 
rationality”, whereas emotional biases are those that “arise spontaneously as a result 
of attitudes and feelings”. Whilst many biases could perhaps be observed within the 
Deal or No Deal framework, the primary purpose of this paper is to identify any 
evidence of an increase or decrease in risk-seeking behaviour, and not to explain 
speculate on biases that may be driving these changes. As such, this section discusses 
only those biases that link strongly to the topics already discussed. 
The gambler’s fallacy is a cognitive bias which occurs as a result of individuals 
misunderstanding the nature of chance. It’s been demonstrated that individuals who 
see a roulette wheel show red a few times sequentially erroneously believe that a 
black is due to show, and place an increased probability of this occurring (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). A contestant on Deal or No Deal experiencing the same illusion 
may believe that an all-red round (unlucky) should be followed by a more forgiving 
round than perhaps the odds would dictate. A contestant with a strong enough 
conviction in this fallacy may have their decision affected when considering the 
banker offer. This is a key example of probability matching Koehler & James (2009). 
The illusion of control bias is the notion that individuals like to believe they have 
more control over uncertain events than they actually do. This is shown by contestants 
regularly choosing boxes in some order that has some personal significance to them. 
Placing exaggerated importance on the order in which boxes are opened can place 
additional pressure on a contestant, and as discussed earlier, pressure most frequently 
has a negative impact on the decision-making process. A way to prevent this from 
                                                          
4 Whilst unverified, no individuals ever played the UK version of the game show more than 
once, to the author’s knowledge. 
 DECISION MAKING UNDER PRESSURE 7 
 
 
happening would be to choose a random order, or even just to open boxes 
sequentially. 
 
IV. METHODOLOGY & DATA COLLECTION 
The data examined has been obtained from two sources. The first dataset has been 
obtained from the official Deal or No Deal website, and contains very general 
information relating to the games of 1686 contestants from January 2006 to 
December 2011. The second dataset has been created by the author from detailed 
reports of the games of 20 random5 individuals from the first dataset, and contains 
much more information relating to the paths taken by contestants through the game. 
These reports were available freely online via a website created by fans of the game 
show. 
The first dataset is to be analysed to provide a general overview of the sample. This 
includes finding out various means and medians relating to the different variables, 
and establishing whether or not the majority of contestants beat the banker6 or not. It 
will also be interesting to investigate whether the banker behaves consistently 
throughout the various seasons, with regards to the generosity of offers made. 
The second dataset will be examined to ultimately answer the research question at 
hand. To do this, two models are developed to estimate the utility of wealth for any 
given contestant. From here, multiple risk coefficients can be produced to measure 
how risky gambling on would be at each banker offer. These risk coefficients vary in 
complexity and efficiency, with each being detailed thoroughly in the next section of 
this paper. 
An extensive list of additional variables will also be collected for each contestant (see 
Table 1). These variables are for the most part the values of the boxes opened by the 
contestants in their correct orders, as any analysis needs to be path-dependent. This 
should highlight any evidence of the altering of reference points, in line with prospect 
theory. From here, all absolute monetary values will be transformed so that the 
utilities of these amounts can be worked with. At each banker offer stage, the various 
models will reflect the risk of continuing on, using the variables at that particular 
point in time. The steps within this section will be carried out for all 20 contestants 
in this dataset. 
                                                          
5 A random number generator was used to ensure that any findings of this paper can reasonably 
be applied to the wider population. 
6 “Beating the banker” is a scenario in which a contestant accepts an offer from the banker of 
greater value than their box contents 
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The analysis of the second dataset will comprise of two subsections. The first will 
look at the sample as a whole, investigating which contestants accept/reject the 
most/least risky gambles, according to the models and risk coefficients devised. The 
average round in which contestants choose to accept the banker offer will also be 
established, as well as the range of maximum risk coefficients associated with each 
contestant’s decision to not gamble further.  
The second subsection of the analysis will attempt to answer the research question. 
As the research question centres on behavioural inconsistencies in the domain of 
losses and gains, these terms must be defined within the context of this study. The 
domain of losses will be characterised as seeing the banker offer reduce by a third or 
more from one round to the next. Similarly, the domain of gains will be characterised 
as seeing the banker offer increase by 50 percent (or more) from one round to the 
next. The scenarios that fit these criteria will be investigated, to analyse the 
contestants’ decisions when facing gambles with the largest and smallest associated 
risk coefficients. These results will be compared with contestants’ decisions when 
facing gambles with similar risk coefficients, though are said to be operating outside 
of any particular domain by the definition outlined in this section. 
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TABLE 1 
Description of Additional Variables within the Detailed Dataset 
 
Variable Name Type Description 
PreviousContestantWinning
s 
Float The amount won by the most recent 
contestant 
Female Binary Indicates contestant's gender 
B1 Float Value of box opened 1st 
B2 Float Value of box opened 2nd 
B3 Float Value of box opened 3rd 
B4 Float Value of box opened 4th 
B5 Float Value of box opened 5th 
B6 Float Value of box opened 6th 
B7 Float Value of box opened 7th 
B8 Float Value of box opened 8th 
B9 Float Value of box opened 9th 
B10 Float Value of box opened 10th 
B11 Float Value of box opened 11th 
B12 Float Value of box opened 12th 
B13 Float Value of box opened 13th 
B14 Float Value of box opened 14th 
B15 Float Value of box opened 15th 
B16 Float Value of box opened 16th 
B17 Float Value of box opened 17th 
B18 Float Value of box opened 18th 
B19 Float Value of box opened 19th 
B20 Float Value of box opened 20th 
B21 Float Value of box opened 21st 
BO1 Float Amount of 1st banker offer 
CD1 Binary Indicates whether contestant dealt to 1st 
banker offer 
BO2 Float Amount of 2nd banker offer 
CD2 Binary Indicates whether contestant dealt to 2nd 
banker offer 
BO3 Float Amount of 3rd banker offer 
CD3 Binary Indicates whether contestant dealt to 3rd 
banker offer 
BO4 Float Amount of 4th banker offer 
CD4 Binary Indicates whether contestant dealt to 4th 
banker offer 
BO5 Float Amount of 5th banker offer 
CD5 Binary Indicates whether contestant dealt to 5th 
banker offer 
BO6 Float Amount of 6th banker offer 
CD6 Binary Indicates whether contestant dealt to 6th 
banker offer 
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V. MODELS & RISK COEFFICIENTS 
To measure a contestant’s aversion to risk, an accurate and consistent measure of the 
riskiness of rejecting a banker offer in favour of gambling must be modelled. An 
extremely basic model might determine this risk coefficient to be simply a function 
of the banker offer (o) over the expected value of the boxes remaining (μ). 
𝑟1 =
𝑜
𝜋
 
This approach however uses absolute monetary values in the equation. As it is not 
the true amounts at stake that are considered by contestants but rather the utility these 
amounts provide, a transformation must be incorporated into the model before any 
evaluation of risk can take place. Intuitive thinking tells us that an extra unit of wealth 
provides less additional utility to a rich individual than to a poor individual. This law 
of diminishing marginal utility was considered by Daniel Bernoulli who hypothesised 
that the utility of wealth (u(x)) can be expressed as a logarithm of the absolute 
monetary value. 
𝑢(𝑥) = log 𝑥 
Contestants on Deal or No Deal can be assumed to gain more additional utility from 
£10,000 to £20,000 than from £100,000 to £110,000. Building on Bernoulli’s 
hypothesis, a transformation function f(x) might look as follows: 
𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑘. ln(𝑥)𝑙 
Variables k and l are parameters and are arbitrary. Setting both to 4.1 produces the 
following curve: 
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With this transformation function, a new risk coefficient r2 can be developed that 
successfully incorporates the law of diminishing marginal utility. 
𝑟2 =
𝑓(𝑜)
𝑓(𝜇)
 
At larger amounts, the rate of change in f(o) and f(μ) decreases, and thus the incentive 
to gamble on also decreases, as contestants acknowledge that more utility can be lost 
from a decrease in some x than can be gained from an increase in the same x. This 
equation, whilst an improvement, still fails to model the evaluation of risk accurately 
under certain circumstances. For example, consider the following two choices: 
50% chance of £90,000 and 50% chance of £110,000 OR £100,000 for sure (c1) 
50% chance of nothing and 50% chance of £200,000 OR £100,000 for sure (c2) 
The expected value of both gambles is the same, and the banker offer is the same. As 
a result the expected utilities are the same, and the respective r2 coefficients for each 
choice are identical, implying that each gamble is as risky as the other. Most people 
would disagree with this suggestion, arguing that choice 2 is considerably riskier than 
choice 1, as a result of the standard deviation (σ) about the mean being much larger. 
The reason an increase in σ of the remaining boxes leads to a perceived increase in 
risk could be due to the tendency for individuals to naturally be more sensitive to 
losses than to gains, and thus increasing the stakes would increase the risk. 
Whilst small losses have been shown to loom larger than small gains, larger amounts 
sees the effect exacerbated (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). As the pain of leaving with 
nothing in choice 2 would be much greater than the increase in utility that could be 
gained from an extra £100,000. It would thus be safer to accept the sure thing in this 
instance. In choice 1 however, the utility provided by the worst possible outcome 
(£90,000) might offset any negative feelings experienced by losing the gamble, and 
hence the gamble is more likely to be taken. Indeed, an individual with immense 
wealth might see both choices as trivial. For the purposes of this study however, 
contestants are assumed to be homogenous with regards to their utilities of wealth. 
To account for the effects a change in σ has on the evaluation of risk, a third risk 
coefficient r3 is defined as follows: 
𝑟3 =
𝑓(𝑜)
𝜎
𝜇⁄ . 𝑓(𝜇)
 
𝑟3 =
𝜇. 𝑓(𝑜)
𝜎. 𝑓(𝜇)
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Incorporating the mean as a proportion of the standard deviation and multiplying this 
by f(μ) leads to a new risk coefficient that is altered by the spread of boxes still 
remaining in play. It is important to note that this model, when applied to the two 
choice problems above, give a larger risk coefficient to choice 1 (10) than to choice 
2 (1). This is due to the extreme values presented in the choices, to illustrate a 
previous point. Choice 1 gives 𝜎 𝜇⁄ = 0.1 which causes such a high r3, whereas in 
reality, 𝜎 𝜇⁄  is never that low. In our dataset, the lowest value is 0.25, and only in 15 
of 120 instances are the values lower than 1. The trend generally is that this 
component shrinks in magnitude throughout a contestant’s game, leading to an 
enlarged (relatively speaking) r3 as time continues. Any analysis will consider this 
limitation when dealing with standard deviation-to-mean ratios lower than 1. 
Though f(x) more accurately reflects the utility of wealth than x, it has severe 
limitations when dealing with small amounts. Though what is defined as a small 
amount will in practice vary between contestants, a general assumption can be made 
that contestants arrive on the game show with some reference point r in their minds. 
The current model has the steepest gradient near the origin, implying this is where 
the most utility is gained for an increase in x. I would argue that amounts smaller than 
the reference point are underweighted, or 𝑢(𝑥) < 𝑥  for 𝑥 < 𝑟. At  r, the utility is 
accurately realised, or 𝑢(𝑥) = 𝑥 at 𝑥 = 𝑟. The utility at 𝑥 > 𝑟 can still be essentially 
modelled by f(x), only shifted horizontally by r and vertically by an arbitrary constant 
c. 
The new model g(x) can be defined as follows: 
𝑔(𝑥) = {
2𝑟𝑥3
(𝑥3−𝑥+2𝑟)3
} for 𝑥 ≤ 𝑟 
𝑔(𝑥) = {𝑘. ln(𝑥 − 𝑟)𝑙 + 𝑐} for 𝑥 > 𝑟 
Setting r to £10,000 seems like a reasonable reference point to define for any given 
contestant. This is due to numerous contestants stating their target amount of around 
this figure before the game has commenced, and the median prize money dealt to 
contestants from the general dataset being only slightly higher at £12,000. Setting c 
to 2000 prevents the gradient of the curve from increasing as x approaches £10,000, 
decreasing briefly from £10,000 to £11,000, before increasing again above £11,000, 
as there is no reason to assume that this would be the case. Keeping k and l at 4.1 
produces the following plots: 
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When plotted on the same graph, the following curve is produced: 
 
Substituting f(x) for g(x) in r2 and r3 creates two new risk coefficients, r4 and r5. 
𝑟4 =
𝑔(𝑜)
𝑔(𝜇)
 
𝑟5 =
𝜇. 𝑔(𝑜)
𝜎. 𝑔(𝜇)
 
The notion of an increasingly risky game has not yet been incorporated into any 
models, besides the gradually decreasing 𝜎 𝜇⁄  (or increasing 
𝜇
𝜎⁄ ). As contestants are 
trying to avoid large values to maximise their offers and expected values, each low 
value box opened (relatively speaking) increases the chances of a high value box 
being opened next. Understanding the game in this way, the increased significance 
of later rounds is apparent, as there is a reduced chance of not finding the large values 
still left in play. 
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The models created to measure risk therefore must incorporate the time-sensitivity of 
the banker offer. A new variable t can be defined to measure how many boxes have 
been opened. Dividing t by 22 and multiplying this by r3 and r5
7 ensures the risk 
coefficients in earlier rounds are smaller than their time-insensitive counterparts. 
These new models, r6 and r7, are formally defined as follows: 
𝑟6 =
𝑡. 𝜇. 𝑓(𝑜)
22. 𝜎. 𝑓(𝜇)
 
𝑟7 =
𝑡. 𝜇. 𝑔(𝑜)
22. 𝜎. 𝑔(𝜇)
 
The models developed in this section will be used to calculate a risk score at any 
banker offer of any contestant’s game. This will be used to provide a general 
overview of how risk-seeking or risk-averse the individuals in the sample are, as well 
as to analyse any increased or decreased risk-seeking behaviour following certain 
events within the game. 
 
VI. ANALYSIS 
VI.1 General Dataset Analysis 
TABLE 2 
Description of Variables within the General Dataset 
 
Variable Name Type Description 
ContestantNumber Integer Chronological ordering of contestants 
Dataset Integer 1 = general dataset, 2 = detailed dataset 
Series Integer The series in which the episode first aired 
EpisodeDate Date The date on which the episode first aired 
ContestantName String The contestant’s name 
PBA Float The amount in the contestant’s box 
MinOffer Float The minimum amount offered by the banker 
MaxOffer Float The maximum amount offered by the banker 
DealtWith Float The contestant’s eventual winnings 
DealtRed Binary Indicates whether winnings were at least £1000 
PlayedUntilEnd Binary Indicates whether contestant played until the end 
                                                          
7 Whilst one could multiply 𝑡 22⁄  by all the risk coefficients up to this point to generate new 
coefficients, this wouldn’t be useful as these coefficients were merely used to derive more 
complex models. 
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Swap8 Binary Indicates whether contestant chose to swap their 
box with the one box remaining upon reaching 
the end of their game 
BeatBanker Binary Indicates whether winnings were higher than 
PBA 
PerfectGame Binary Indicates whether contestant won the maximum 
amount possible from their game 
  
Table 2 lists the variables contained within the general dataset. Although this dataset 
cannot be analysed to provide an answer to the research question, preliminary 
analysis can be conducted to give a general overview of how contestants generally 
fare on the game show. Summarising the key variables (all those beneath the break 
in Table 2) and establishing various means will provide a reference point to help 
further understand any deviations from these values in the detailed dataset in the next 
section. 
TABLE 3 
Summary of Key Variables within the General Dataset 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
PBA 1686 24669.14 53768.92 .01 250000 
MinOffer 1686 2702.036 3375.875 -150 17500 
MaxOffer 1686 26953.94 25579.39 250 172000 
DealtWith 1686 15507.38 19617.08 .01 250000 
DealtRed 1686 .8084223 .3936592 0 1 
BeatBanker 1686 .4744958 .4994973 0 1 
PerfectGame 1686 .2390273 .426616 0 1 
      
 
The mean value contained with a contestant box was £24,669.14 over this period, 
whilst the average amount dealt to contestants was £15,507.38. Whilst this divide 
may initially appear to suggest that contestants often settle for considerably less than 
their box contains, the table also reveals that over 47% of contestants beat the banker 
during their games. The reason for this considerable divide is due to the fixed box 
values increasing exponentially, distorting the analysis and reducing the significance 
of using means. More useful is to look at the median values, to know where 50% of 
                                                          
8 Although some data for this variable has been collected by the author, the dataset’s lack of 
detail ensures it is not possible to identify occurrences of contestants choosing to swap and 
receiving less than their original box contents. For this reason, no extensive analysis will be 
conducted on this variable. As a result, there are expected to be a few records that are 
erroneously coded as PlayedUntilEnd=0, though this is not expected to be a large number and 
thus not anticipated to hinder any analysis. 
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the sample lies below and above, with regards to the player’s box amount and 
eventual winnings. 
TABLE 4 
Detailed Summary of the PBA and DealtWith Variables 
 
Percentiles 
% PBA DealtWith 
1% 0.01 0.01 
5% 0.1 1 
10% .5 20 
25% 10 3000 
50% 750 12000 
75% 20000 20000 
90% 75000 30000 
95% 100000 44000 
99% 250000 88000 
 
Looking at the medians as opposed to the means tells a different story. In Table 4 it 
can be seen that 50% of contestants had £750 or less in their box (as expected), yet 
50% of contestants won up to £12,000. Of these, half won at least £3000. At the other 
end of the scale, 10% of contestants had at least £75,000 in their box whereas only 
5% won more than £44,000, with just 1% winning more than £88,000. 
Examining only those contestants who beat the banker reveals that when this occurs, 
it’s often quite a substantial gain. Table 4 shows that in over 96% of cases, the 
contestant won more than £1000, and the average winnings were nearly £18,000. This 
is compared with an average box value of little over £2500. As before, an examination 
of the median values should also be conducted for clarity. 
TABLE 5 
Summary of a Subset of Key Variables for BeatBanker = 1 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
PBA 800 2597.436 7355.923 0.01 100000 
DealtWith 800 17823.62 16821.97 0.04 250000 
DealtRed 800 0.96125 0.193119 0 1 
PerfectGame 800 0.40875 0.491911 0 1 
 
TABLE 6 
Detailed Summary of the PBA and DealtWith Variables for BeatBanker = 1 
 
Percentiles 
% PBA DealtWith 
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1% 0.01 15.5 
5% 0.01 1100 
10% 0.1 3557.5 
25% 1 8000 
50% 100 15000 
75% 1000 22475 
90% 10000 31837.5 
95% 15000 42000 
99% 35000 80500 
 
As displayed by Table 6, the values at the various percentiles support the arguments 
made by the mean values in Table 4. 75% of contestants who beat the banker had 
less than £1000 in their box, yet 95% left with more than £1100 in prize money. 
Although analysis shows that contestants who beat the banker normally do very well, 
these individuals are just under half of the entire sample. Table 7 shows that the 478 
contestants who won less than their box value received an average prize of just over 
£16,000. Although this figure is considerably less than the average PBA of nearly 
£75,000, it again must be noted that this figure may be distorted by the extremely 
high box values of a few contestants. Table 8 examines the values at various 
percentiles. 
 
TABLE 7 
Summary of a Subset of Key Variables for DealtWith < PBA 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
PBA 478 74405.93 77482.38 0.1 250000 
DealtWith 478 16607.46 14687.31 0.01 107031 
 
 
 
TABLE 8 
Detailed Summary of the PBA and DealtWith Variables for DealtWith < PBA 
 
Percentiles 
% PBA DealtWith 
1% 1 0.01 
5% 1000 9 
10% 5000 750 
25% 20000 6600 
50% 50000 15000 
75% 100000 22000 
90% 250000 30000 
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95% 250000 44000 
99% 250000 75000 
 
50% of this subset may have been disappointed to discover their box contained more 
than £50,000. However, 75% still left with over £6600, and 50% left with over 
£15,000. Based on this data, although a significant decrease in prize money in real 
monetary terms is apparent for many contestants, the law of diminishing marginal 
utility ensures that many contestants would not be as disheartened as may have been 
expected. 
It can be argued then, that accepting a banker offer, regardless of the ultimate box 
value, may not leave a contestant particularly susceptible to negative emotions 
following a game, if the amount dealt at provides a significant increase in utility. 
Many contestants may reach a point in which they know that the utility gained from 
accepting an offer will offset any amount of utility perceived to have been ‘lost’ by 
ultimately having a much higher amount in their box. 
From this, it can be deduced that only the most risk-seeking contestants choose to 
play to the end, in an effort to maximise their utility by trying to win the highest 
amount possible9. These contestants averages are detailed in Table 9. The average 
prize of over £18,400 may seem to imply that playing until the end of the game is a 
wise thing to do. However, the table also shows that at least one individual won the 
largest prize of £250,000, and virtually half of this subset left with under £1000. The 
values at various percentiles are described in Table 10.  
                                                          
9 This section refers to a contestant who continuously rejects offers deemed to provide 
significant utility, based on the transformation model g(x) defined in section V. A contestant that 
never has an offer of greater than £10,000 would not fit these criteria. 
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TABLE 9 
Summary of a Subset of Key Variables for PlayedUntilEnd = 1 & MaxOffer > 
10000 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
PBA 246 15077.6 34630.89 0.01 250000 
DealtWith 246 18422.7 38595.44 0.01 250000 
DealtRed 246 0.5325203 0.4999585 0 1 
 
 
 
TABLE 10 
Detailed Summary DealtWith Variable for PlayedUntilEnd = 1 & MaxOffer > 
10000 
 
Percentiles 
% DealtWith 
1% 0.01 
5% 0.01 
10% 0.5 
25% 10 
50% 3000 
75% 20000 
90% 50000 
95% 76000 
99% 250000 
 
As suspected, the mean is again a misleading statistic, with 75% of individuals who 
choose to play to the end receiving less than £20,000. Perhaps more concerning for 
risk-seeking contestants is that half of this group wins £3000 or less; amounts 
providing very little utility according to our model g(x), and highly unlikely to offset 
any utility potentially lost by setting up a new reference point at the highest offer 
received. Although large amounts can be won by playing until the end, larger amounts 
are won more frequently by contestants who choose to deal, as detailed by Table 11. 
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TABLE 11 
Detailed Summary of the DealtWith Variable for MaxOffer > 10000 by 
PlayedUntilEnd 
 
DealtWith 
% PlayedUntilEnd = 0 PlayedUntilEnd = 1 
1% 0.26 0.01 
5% 1100 0.01 
10% 5000 0.5 
25% 10000 10 
50% 16500 3000 
75% 24000 20000 
90% 32000 50000 
95% 42000 76000 
99% 75000 250000 
Max 110000 250000 
 
The central 50% of those who choose to deal are considerably better off than their 
counterparts that elect to play until the end, accepting offers between £10,000 and 
£24,000. Those in this range who choose to gamble win between £10 and £20,000. 
The bottom 10% of the first group are also better off, accepting offers of up to £5000, 
compared to those in the second group who find a maximum of 50p in their boxes. 
The only percentile of contestants in the second group who win more than their group 
one counterparts are those in the top 10%, who luckily open their box to find values 
between £50,000 and £250,000. The top 10% of banker offers that are accepted, 
meanwhile, range from between £33,000 and £110,000. 
 
VI.II. Detailed Dataset Analysis 
As the r7 model can be taken to be the most sophisticated measure of risk developed 
in this study, this is the metric we shall use throughout this section of the analysis. As 
such, we shall continue by using simply the notation r. 
Comparing the largest risk coefficients associated with rejected banker offers by each 
contestant should give some indication as to how risk-seeking each contestant is. 
However, this will only reveal that a contestant’s the tipping point10 r is larger than 
this value. It is more useful to show these values alongside the r coefficient of the 
offer the contestant ultimately accepted, to display the bounds between which a 
                                                          
10 Tipping point refers to the r coefficient that would lead to a contestant switching from “no 
deal” to “deal”. 
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contestant’s tipping point exists. This is of course not possible for the contestants who 
chose to play until the end. Table 12 displays the results. 
TABLE 12  
Comparing the largest risk coefficients associated with rejected banker offers 
 
Contestant 
Number 
Obs Max r Deal r 
1 4 0.161805 0.181889 
2 4 0.146163 0.070935 
3 4 0.205801 0.285477 
4 5 0.252832 0.509325 
5 4 0.247141 0.317983 
6 4 0.227189 0.232664 
7 4 0.08178 0.163035 
8 4 0.019661 0.216087 
9 6 0.061469 N/A 
10 6 0.350167 N/A 
11 5 0.216245 2.727273 
12 6 1.330767 N/A 
13 6 0.637755 N/A 
14 3 0.071456 0.118678 
15 2 0.062228 0.106933 
16 4 0.085566 0.17772 
17 4 0.083327 0.260924 
18 2 0.054084 0.079511 
19 4 0.03801 0.478981 
20 6 0.137844 N/A 
 
According to the data here, contestants 12 and 13 are the most risk-seeking. Both 
contestants played until the end, though with different results, winning £250 and 
£35,000 respectively. When contestant 12 was facing the final offer with an r 
coefficient of 1.330767, the maximum that could be won was £250, and the minimum 
was £100. With this in mind, it is perhaps not so surprising that the contestant chose 
to gamble, and we should be cautious when stating that contestant 12 is the most risk-
seeking of all the contestants. Contestant 13 meanwhile saw an ever-increasing list 
of offers that led to the final offer of £16,000. The remaining boxes contained £3000 
and £35,000, and as such choosing to gamble can be seen as risk-seeking behaviour, 
given the non-linear nature of the utility function. 
It is interesting that contestant 2 changes their risk preferences from one round to the 
next, based on our models. This could be due to initially taking a risk that would be 
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outside their typical preferences, and following this round made a decision deemed 
to be more comfortable to them. 
 
On the other end of the scale, the contestants deemed to be the most risk-averse are 
contestants 15 and 18. As well as dealing at the third offer, they also rejected gambles 
with a relatively low r coefficient. This could however be due to other reasons, such 
as having prior expectations or aims and sticking to them. 
A look at the amount offered by the banker shows that on average banker offers 
increase as time goes on. Furthermore, the offers also increase as a percentage of the 
expected value of the contestant’s box. As discussed by a previous paper the ‘unfair’ 
banker offers at earlier rounds could be to deter contestants from dealing too early, 
with offers becoming increasingly more generous as time goes on (Post et. al, 2008). 
The standard deviation of banker offers however increases considerably between 
offers 2 and 3, before becoming extremely large at offer 6. This suggests that although 
the average values offered are increasing, there is also an increasingly wider range of 
values from which the banker can make an offer. 
 
TABLE 13 
Summary of Banker Offers by Round 
 
 Banker Offer Banker Offer as % of 
Expected Value 
Off 
Num 
Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Mean Std. 
Dev 
Min Max 
1 20 5939.05 3979 500 13000 23.79 13.4 3.1 46.4 
2 20 9040 4596 250 15000 36.31 17.1 2.8 67.6 
3 20 10093.25 7262 15 30000 40.10 19 0.1 90 
4 20 12270.75 8348 200 33000 46.88 19.9 6.26 90.1 
5 20 13627.55 9095 600 35000 58.78 19.4 26.9 89.2 
6 20 20420.89 31130 0.13 101000 72.56 20.5 32 100 
 
Switching focus over to only those individuals deemed to be operating the domains 
of losses and gains (DoG/L) enables us to attempt to answer the research question. 
Due to each contestant only being able to deal once in a game, it isn’t possible to say 
whether or not an individual operating in either domain is more or less risk-averse 
than they would be if they were operating normally11. It is possible however to study 
                                                          
11 ‘Normally’, in this context, refers to an individual not said to be operating in the domain of 
losses or gains. 
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the r coefficient of gambles in different domains, and to analyse contestant decisions. 
Comparing these decisions with those made by contestants operating normally 
though facing similar prospects may lend credence to the argument that contestants 
are behaving in line with the predictions of prospect theory. 
As defined previously, a contestant is said to be operating in the DoL if their current 
offer is worth no more than two-thirds of the previous offer. Likewise, the DoG is 
defined by seeing the offer increase by a minimum of 50% of the previous offer. This 
analysis will use the utilities of the banker offers as opposed to the absolute values, 
in line with the literature and arguments already made. A summary of banker offers 
and contestant decisions by domain is described by Table 14. 
TABLE 14 
Banker Offers & Contestant Decisions by Domain 
 
 Normal Domain of Gains Domain of Losses 
 Offer Decision Offer Decision Offer Decision 
Obs 27 27 55.00 55.00 20 20 
Mean 15010.3 0.2592593 9980.35 0.09 4815.75 0.15 
St. Dev. 14703.59 0.4465761 6165.27 0.29 5465.832 0.366348 
Min 700 0 500 0 15 0 
Max 75000 1 30000 1 17500 1 
 
The table displays a reduced proportion of individuals in the domains of gains and 
losses choosing to deal, relative to their normal counterparts. On average however, 
the banker offer was significantly lower than for normal individuals in these two 
domains, at two thirds the value in the DoG and one third the value in the DoL. As 
the utility gained from amounts under £10,000 is underweighted, it would be useful 
to see the same table for only offers of over this figure. This data is described by 
Table 15. 
TABLE 15 
Banker Offer & Contestant Decisions by Domain for Offer >= 10000 
 
 Normal Domain of Gains Domain of Losses 
 Offer Decision Offer Decision Offer Decision 
Obs 18 18 25 25 5 5 
Mean 20162.67 0.388889 15474.6 0.16 12700 0.2 
Std. Dev 15507.87 0.501631 4512.721 0.374166 3734.97 0.447214 
Min 10000 0 10000 0 10000 0 
Max 75000 1 30000 1 17500 1 
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Again, fewer contestants choose to deal when operating the domains of losses and 
gains, though this should come as a surprise seeing as the banker offers are lower on 
average. As such, there is not enough evidence from this table to suggest an increase 
or decrease in risk aversion when operating in either domain. Furthermore, it is hard 
to draw any real conclusions about contestants operating in the domain of losses as 
the sample size of 5 is far too small. 
As such, redefining the DoL may be necessary. The current definition compares the 
utilities of the current offer with the previous offer, implying any offers prior to that 
are not factored into a contestant’s perception of their domain. It could be argued that 
a contestant would set their reference point at the highest offer received so far, and 
compare their current offer with that. We will maintain that to be classed as the DoL 
the current offer must be a maximum of two-thirds the value of the largest offer so 
far. Using this definition of DoL, Table 16 looks at banker offers, means and r 
coefficients for contestants who chose not to deal, by their respective domains. 
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TABLE 16 
Banker Offer, Means & r-coefficients for Deal = 0 by Domain 
 
 Normal Domain of Gains Domain of Losses 
 Offer Mean r Offer Mean r Offer Mean r 
Obs 19 19 19 43 43 43 25 25 25 
Mean 11488.3 29386.9 0.06 10327.16 26053.17 0.07 3936.64 12565.73 0.09 
Std. Dev 9108.2 13271.6 0.09 5864.86 10295.06 0.12 4127.27 10495.51 0.26 
Min 700 10921.3 <0.01 500 11377.83 <0.01 15 175 <0.01 
Max 35000 60650.2 0.25 30000 50005 0.64 17500 36170.01 1.33 
 Offer as % of Mean Offer as % of Mean Offer as % of Mean 
Obs 19  43   25  
Mean 36.81  40.47   35.79  
Std. Dev 23.67  18.03   21.55  
Min 5.01  3.13   0.05  
Max 90.05  84.21   85.71  
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Here we see similar average r values, largest in the DoL. The r value in the DoG is 
slightly smaller, though is still larger than the values for contestants in neither 
domain. This implies that contestants in the DoG or losses on average accept more 
risky gambles than their normally-operating counterparts, with the results strongest 
in the DoL. Furthermore, the most risky gamble accepted by contestants in the normal 
domain had an r coefficient of 0.25, compared with values of 0.64 and 1.33 for 
contestants in the domains of gains and losses, respectively. If the ‘fairness’ of the 
banker offer is modelled as being a percentage of the expected value of the 
contestant’s box, there is no real difference between the different domains, and in fact 
the banker’s offers are slightly fairer in the Domain of Gains. 
Switching our attention to the instances in which contestants choose to deal, as 
displayed by Table 17, we can see that it takes a much fairer offer on average to entice 
the contestant in the DoL to deal, and the average r coefficient for gambles considered 
too risky to continue were higher for the DoL and gains, with the case much more 
pronounced in the domain of losses. It is of course an important limitation of this 
study that these sample sizes are small and limited to a particular environment, 
prompting further research in the area. 
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TABLE 17 
Banker Offer, Means & r-coefficients for Deal = 1 by Domain 
 
 Normal Domain of Gains Domain of Losses 
 Offer Mean r Offer Mean r Offer Mean r 
Obs 7 7 7 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Mean 26357.14 49304.84 0.23 18125 33211.03 0.28 8187.5 13306.3 0.8 
Std. 
Dev 
21734.6 35784.49 0.15 3424.79 14650.72 0.13 6440.03 10959.18 1.29 
Min 14000 22020.22 0.08 15000 21010 0.18 750 750 0.07 
Max 75000 126500 0.51 23000 53201.1 0.48 16000 24013 2.73 
 Offer as % of Mean Offer as % of Mean Offer as % of Mean 
Obs 7 4 4 
Mean 55.87 59.41 73.25 
Std. 
Dev 
20.46 16.64 21.75 
Min 33.61 43.23 48.08 
Max 88.3 80.91 100 
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VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
By analysing contestants’ decisions when operating in the domains of losses and 
gains this paper can conclude that there is evidence to suggest an increase in risk-
seeking behaviour when operating in both domains.  This is most notably the case 
when the reference point is estimated to be equal to the highest offer received up to 
that point. Under this definition, contestants are observed to accept riskier gambles 
when in the domain of losses than non-DoL contestants, and also require a fairer 
banker offer to entice them to deal. This is in line with the findings of other Deal or 
No Deal studies (Post et al, 2013), and contradicts prospect theory’s prediction of 
increased risk aversion in the domain of gains. 
However, a key limitation of this study is the quantity of data examined in detail. 20 
contestants were assessed in detail allowing the analysis, the authors suggest further 
research based on the population of contestants. 
Nevertheless, this paper contributes to the field of behavioural economics by 
potentially observing evidence of inconsistent risk preferences among individuals 
when faced with uncertain prospects. Further study into this area may reinforce the 
findings of this paper, and due to the ease of access to data and the ideal format of 
the game is greatly encouraged. As mentioned, a larger sample size would certainly 
assist when drawing conclusions, and further development of the coefficients 
associated with gambles may lead to a more accurate measure of the risks contestants 
face. Furthermore, the incorporation of probabilities into any models was omitted in 
this paper though should certainly be explored. This perhaps could include the 
overweighting and underweighting of low and high probabilities as described by a 
more recent development on prospect theory, cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1993). 
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APPENDIX 
A. Box Values 
The 22 fixed prizes in Deal or No Deal (UK) are shown below in a similar style to 
that shown within the program. Red values indicate the largest 50%, whilst blue 
values indicate the smallest 50%. 
1p £1,000 
10p £3,000 
50p £5,000 
£1 £10,000 
£5 £15,000 
£10 £20,000 
£50 £35,000 
£100 £50,000 
£250 £75,000 
£500 £100,000 
£750 £250,000 
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B. Data 
An example of some of the information collected about a contestant in the detailed 
dataset: 
 
 
t Box Opened Value Eliminated (VE)f(VE) g(VE) Total Prize Remaining (TPR)
0 565666.61
1 B1 15000.00 43956.70 40207.54 550666.61
2 B2 0.01 #NUM! 0.00 550666.60
3 B3 1000.00 11325.71 2.92 549666.60
4 B4 1.00 0.00 0.00 549665.60
5 B5 75000.00 82906.10 118960.65 474665.60
6 B6 10000.00 36839.54 10000.00 464665.60
7 B7 0.50 #NUM! 0.00 464665.10
8 B8 20000.00 49603.84 55279.55 444665.10
9 B9 250.00 4520.70 0.04 444415.10
10 B10 50.00 1100.60 0.00 444365.10
11 B11 5.00 28.85 0.00 444360.10
12 B12 5000.00 26730.03 714.29 439360.10
13 B13 50000.00 71298.29 98683.59 389360.10
14 B14 100000.00 91969.79 134269.27 289360.10
15 B15 750.00 9513.08 1.18 288610.10
16 B16 35000.00 62142.96 81728.78 253610.10
17 B17 10.00 125.28 0.00 253600.10
18 B18 3000.00 20742.90 109.31 250600.10
19 B19 500.00 7341.42 0.34 250100.10
20 B20 100.00 2148.28 0.00 250000.10
21 B21 250000.00 125893.47 189803.10 0.10
